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Abstract Rights versus Paper Rights under
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code
Robert Charles Clarkt
The documentary embodiment of a secured party's rights has in-
triguing and varying consequences in a number of situations governed
by Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code.' This article will
explore some of these consequences and the broader questions they
raise, and will suggest some hypotheses about the functional signifi-
cance of documentation 2 and alternatives to documentation in different
branches of commercial life. For brevity, and to avoid confusion over
the word "documentary," such embodiments of rights are referred to
here by a phrase not found in the UCC, "paper rights."
The article will examine problems concerning four specific kinds
of paper rights: promissory notes3 and stock certificates 4 (defined by
Article 9 as members of a larger class of paper rights called "instru-
ments"5), warehouse receipts6 (a part of the larger Article 9 class of
- Assistant Professor of Law, Yale University.
1. Hereinafter cited as the UCC or the Code or by section number only. All citations
are to the 1972 official text unless otherwise indicated.
2. By "documentation" I mean the evidencing of rights in a paper form that rises to
the level of a negotiable or quasi-negotiable instrument or document.
3. See § 3-104:
(1) Any writing to be a negotiable instrument within this Article must
(a) be signed by the maker or drawer; and
(b) contain an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum certain in money and
no other promise, order, obligation or power given by the maker or drawer
except as authorized by this Article; and
(c) be payable on demand or at a definite time; and
(d) be payable to order or to bearer.
(2) A writing which complies with the requirements of this section is
idi *a "note" if it is a promise other than a certificate of deposit.
(3) As used in other Articles of this Act, and as the context may require, the
[following] terms [including] ... "note" may refer to instruments which are not
negotiable within this Article as well as to instruments which are so negotiable.
4. See § 8-102(l)(a), quoted in note 39 infra.
5. See § 9-105(l)(i):
"Instrument" means a negotiable instrument (defined in Section 3-104), or a security
(defined in Section 8-102) or any other writing which evidences a right to the pay-
ment of money and is not itself a security agreement or lease and is of a type which
is in ordinary course of business transferred by delivery with any necessary indorse-
ment or assignment....
6. See § 1-201(45):
"Warehouse receipt" means a receipt issued by a person engaged in the business of
storing goods for hire.
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"documents" 7), and "chattel paper" (a broad Article 9 classification).
Each of these pieces of paper puts its holder in a legal position some-
what different from that of the mere possessor of the underlying or
corresponding unembodied form of the right; the holder has a right
which has been "concretized" in the paper, rather than remaining an
abstract right to the property.
In the case of instruments like promissory notes or stock certificates,
the corresponding unembodied right is usually an intangible, a right
which does not represent an interest in particular, concrete personal
property but which represents instead an interest, defined by a formula
or a set of rules, in a legally recognizable locus of value. Consider the
situation which gives rise to a promissory note. A consumer's obliga-
tion to pay money to a retailer may be called an account receivable or,
in UCC terminology, an account.9 The obligation may of course be
satisfied by any of the money, or indirectly by any of the property,
owned by the consumer.'0 Furthermore, the retailer may treat the
account as intangible property and may sell or hypothecate it. On the
other hand, the consumer's obligation may be embodied in more or
less definite paper form, as when he gives the retailer a promissory
note. The retailer then has a paper right rather than an abstract right.
The shareholder in a corporation finds himself in a similar situa-
tion. Traditionally, a shareholder's interest has been represented by a
7. See § 9-105(l)(f):
"Document" means document of title as defined in the general definitions of Article
1 (Section 1-201), and a receipt of the kind described in subsection (2) of Section 7-201
See § 1-201(15):
"Document of title" includes bill of lading, dock warrant, dock receipt, warehouse
receipt or order for the delivery of goods, and also any other document which in the
regular course of business or financing is treated as adequately evidencing that the
person in possession of it is entitled to receive, hold and dispose of the document
and the goods it covers. To be a document of title a document must purport to be
issued by or addressed to a bailee and purport to cover goods in the bailee's pos-
session which are either identified or are fungible portions of an identified mass.
8. See § 9-105(l)(b):
"Chattel paper" means a writing or writings which evidence both a monetary
obligation and a security interest in or lease of specific goods, but a charter or other
contract involving the use or hire of a vessel is not chattel paper. When a transaction
is evidenced both by such a security agreement or a lease and by an instrument or
series of instruments, the group of writings taken together constitutes chattel paper.
9. See § 9-106:
"Account" means any right to payment for goods sold or leased or for services
rendered which is not evidenced by an instrument or chattel paper, whether or not
it has been earned by performance.
10. That is, the retailer has a claim against the total pool of his debtor's nonexempt
resources. Of course, specific items of property owned by the debtor may be subject to
claims that take precedence over the retailer; other creditors and claimants may have
priority in the residual pool of assets over retailer's claim in that pool; and the as-
semblage of claimants on a par with the retailer may have claims which in toto greatly
exceed the value of the pool of resources left over for them so that, in a bankruptcy
proceeding, each would receive a partial but pro rata satisfaction of his claim.
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piece of paper, the stock certificate. However, certificates are not re-
quired by the laws of all states, 1 and it is quite normal for a share-
holder in some types of public corporations to possess a shareholder
interest without there being any corresponding certificate. 12 In this
article I will refer to such an unembodied shareholder interest as a
"share" in contrast to a "stock certificate."'13
In the case of the paper rights classed as documents (including ware-
house receipts) and chattel paper, the corresponding abstract (i.e., not
paperized) right or entitlement is usually in specific tangible property,
or at least in a defined quantity of tangible property that is "fung-
ible"' 4 with similar property. Thus, a secured party may possess a
nondocumented interest in specific, tangible goods of a debtor. (It
is rare that such a secured party's interest would not be referred to in
a writing of some sort, but often enough the writing will not rise to
the dignity of a document in the legal sense.) When the debtor of such
a secured party bails the particular goods with a warehouseman, the
interests of both the debtor and the secured party may become em-
bodied in a warehouse receipt and may thus become a paper right.
Similarly, a secured party's security interest in goods may be abstract or
it may be represented by what the UCC refers to as "chattel paper."'1
In order to test the significance of possessing a paper right instead
of a mere abstract right, the following section will explore certain
priority problems arising between possessors of the two kinds of
rights.' 6 The general paradigm is as follows: Debtor, who has an in-
11. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 156B (1970) (general statutory provisions
governing Massachusetts business corporations nowhere require that shares be evidenced
by certificates). The inference from § 27 of chapter 156B, which states that each stock-
holder "shall be entitled to a certificate stating the number and the class and the
designation of the series, if any, of the shares held by him," is that shareholders may, at
their option, obtain certificates but need not do so.
12. Many mutual funds, including funds which specialize in money market instruments
and advertise the ease and quickness with which shareholders can retrieve their invest-
ments, do not in fact issue stock certificates representing shares sold unless requested to
do so by the particular shareholder who owns the shares. See, e.g., Dreyfus Liquid Assets,
Inc., Prospectus, May 15, 1974, at 8; The Johnston Mutual Fund, Inc., Prospectus, May
1, 1974, at 11. The former fund is incorporated in Maryland (see Dreyfus Prospectus at
10); the latter, in New York (see Johnston Prospectus at 2).
13. In common parlance, the term "share,' is ambiguous and is often taken to mean
a certificate as well as the interest it represents. For purposes of clarity, the term as
used here should not be taken to connote a certificate.
14. See § 1-201(17):
"Fungible" with respect to goods or securities means goods or securities of which
any unit is, by nature or usage of trade, the equivalent of any other like unit.
15. See note 8 supra (definition of chattel paper). For a discussion at length of priority
problems involving chattel paper, see Levie, Security Interests in Chattel Paper, 78 YaLE
L.J. 935 (1969).
16. In some of the situations discussed, the priority problem is commercially insignif-
icant. This article is, however, largely concerned with attempting to achieve a more basic
theoretical understanding of the role of "paperization" of rights.
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terest in property, either tangible or intangible, deals first with a party
who obtains a security interest in an abstract right. This first secured
party properly perfects his interest by following the procedures set
forth in Article 9. Debtor then wrongfully converts the abstract right
into a paper right and pledges it to an innocent second secured party.
The question then arises as to which secured party has priority in
Debtor's right.' 7 This paradigm will be examined using each of the
four specific pairs of rights mentioned earlier: account versus note;
share versus stock certificate; interest in goods versus warehouse receipt;
and interest in goods versus chattel paper.
The resolution of the basic priority paradigm is not the same in
each of the four specific contexts. In the account versus note situation,
17. A common problem throughout the analyses in this article of specific situations is
whether the transfer by the debtor in question to the second secured party is voidable as
a fraudulent conveyance, either in bankruptcy or in a proceeding or action sanctioned by
state fraudulent conveyance laws. Under § 67d of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)
(1970), it is fairly clear that in each example the Debtor's granting a security interest
to the second secured party is a fraudulent conveyance, since it is by hypothesis made
with the "actual intent.., to ... defraud" referred to in § 67d(2)(d). However, not every-
thing that is properly characterized as a fraudulent conveyance is voidable. The operative
part of the federal provisions, § 67d(6), states that a transfer fraudulent against creditors
having claims provable under the Bankruptcy Act shall be null and void against the
trustee in bankruptcy "except as to a bona fide purchaser, lienor, or obligee for a present
fair equivalent value." In all of the examples discussed in this article, the second
secured party acts in good faith and gives a contemporaneous, fair advance in return for
the security interest he receives. His right thus cannot be voided on the basis of § 67d;
whether he has priority over the first secured party depends essentially on the provisions
of the UCC. In this respect, the large number of state fratidulent conveyance laws which
adopt a version of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act (which is quite similar to §
67d) would lead to the same result. See 9B UNIFORM LAws ANN. 70 (1966) (lists states
adopting Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act).
The phrase in the "except" clause of § 67d(6), "present fair equivalent value" (em-
phasis added), may lead one to wonder whether a secured party invoking the exception
must have made an advance equal in amount to the value of the collateral. Such an in-
terpretation would seem absurd, in view of customary collateral coverage ratios and the
dual definition of "fair" consideration set forth in § 67d(l)(e): In outright purchase
situations, the test of fair consideration is equivalence of value between the transferred
property and the consideration given for it, but in a secured transaction, consideration is
fair when the debt in question is not "disproportionately small" in relation to the value
of the collateral. Furthermore, § 67d(6) contains a proviso that "such purchaser, lienor,
or obligee, who without actual fraudulent intent has given a consideration less than
fair, as defined in this subdivision, for such transfer, lien, or obligation, may retain the
property, lien, or obligation as securty for repayment." This proviso was obviously written
with the outright purchase situation principally in mind-if the transferor had a
fraudulent intent or if the transfer were otherwise a fraudulent conveyance, but if the
transferee was without fraudulent intent in giving less than fair consideration, the trans-
feree, though he cannot keep the property, nevertheless has the right to get his money
back, and this right is secured by the transferred property. The proviso is not restricted
to the outright purchase situation, however, and it seems to imply clearly that, even if
in the situations discussed in this article the second secured party were not regarded as
giving "present fair equivalent value" (because few secured parties would ever accept
collateral whose value only equals the amount of their loans), the second secured party
would still have the right to retain his status as secured party as long as he was without
actual fraudulent intent.
Therefore, fraudulent conveyance problems do not form a decisive element in the
determination of rights as between the first and second secured party in the situations
analyzed here as specific versions of the priority problem paradigm.
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the secured party who is second in time to perfect has priority over
the first; in the share versus stock certificate situation, the second
secured party probably has priority; in the interest in goods versus
warehouse receipt situation, the first secured party has priority if the
goods were equipment in the hands of the debtor, but only arguably
has priority if they were inventory; and in the interest in goods versus
chattel paper situation, the first secured party will have priority under
a blindly literal analysis of the Code.
In the first section of this article, I shall justify these conclusions by
an interpretation and analysis of the relevant provisions of Article 9
of the UCC. In the second section, I shall attempt to justify the Code
determinations in light of certain basic policy considerations. In the
third section, I shall place the policy considerations themselves within
a more systematic theoretical analysis of the legal devices used to
mitigate the dysfunctions of the abstract holding of rights.
I. Patterns of Priority
A. Account versus Note
Suppose that Buyer buys goods from Dealer. No note is given; all
that happens is that an account is created on which Buyer is the ac-
count debtor' 8 and Dealer is the obligee. Dealer then grants to Bank
a security interest in all of Dealer's accounts in connection with a loan
from Bank to Dealer. Bank perfects its interest by making a proper
UCC filing of a financing statement. The statement covers all accounts
and proceeds thereof. Without telling Bank, Dealer later requests that
Buyer execute a demand note to evidence the account. After receiving
the note, Dealer immediately pledges it to Finance Company in order
to secure a contemporaneous loan from Finance Company to Dealer.
Under Article 9, who has priority in Dealer's rights against Buyer-
Bank or Finance Company? In order to answer this question, as well
as the parallel questions raised in each of the other three specific
situations discussed below, we must consider in each case two similar
but different lines of analysis-one based principally on § 9-308(a)' 9
18. See § 9-l05(I)(a): "[T]he person who is obligated on an account, chattel paper or
general intangible."
19. A purchaser of chattel paper or an instrument who gives new value and takes
possession of it in the ordinary course of his business has priority over a security
interest in the chattel paper or instrument
(a) which is perfected under Section 9-304 (permissive filing and temporary perfec-
tion) or under Section 9-306 (perfection as to proceeds) if he acts without knowledge
that the specific paper or instrument is subject to a security interest; or
449
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and one based principally on § 9-309.20
Under § 9-308(a), which deals with the priority rights of certain
purchasers of chattel paper or instruments, it is clear that Finance
Company, which is a "purchaser" 21 within the meaning of that section
and has met the section's qualifications by giving new value for the
note and taking possession of it in the ordinary course of its business,
is intended to have priority over a security interest in the instrument
which is perfected in ways specified in the section. The first of these is
perfection under § 9-304,22 which inter alia concerns "permissive fil-
(b) which is claimed merely as proceeds of inventory subject to a security interest
(Section 9-306) even though he knows that the specific paper or instrument is subject
to the security interest.
Section 9-308(b) does not lend itself to the kind of puzzling situation about which I am
chiefly concerned. It states in effect that chattel paper and note financers (discounters)
who take possession of chattel paper or instruments generated by the dealer will prevail
over inventory financers who claim such items as proceeds of the dealer's sale of in-
ventory. See Associates Discount Corp. v. Old Freeport Dank, 421 Pa. 609, 220 A.2d 621
(1966), where, in just such a basic factual situation, the bank inventory financer had
used its leverage to get the dealer's customer to execute a second security agreement and
make payments under it; the court held that the bank received the payments as con-
structive trustee for the finance company which had taken the original set of papers.
In the § 9-208(b) sort of dispute, interesting problems may arise as to when the in-
ventory is deemed to have been sold and thus converted into proceeds. See Chrysler
Credit Corp. v. Sharp, 56 Misc. 2d 261, 288 N.Y.S.2d 525 (Sup. Ct. 1968), where an auto-
mobile dealer had entered into an agreement for the sale of an automobile to a cus-
tomer, had obtained chattel paper as part of the consideration therefor, and had in effect
repossessed the car before it left the dealer's possession. The inventory financer, a bank,
seized and sold the car in order to apply the proceeds against the dealer's obligations to
it. The court held that the car had already been sold at the time of seizure and there-
fore had to be viewed, not as inventory of the dealer, but as proceeds of chattel paper.
The bank therefore lost the sales proceeds to the chattel paper financer, a finance
company.
20. Nothing in this Article limits the rights of a holder in due course of a negotiable
instrument (Section 3-302) or a holder to whom a negotiable document of title has
been duly negotiated (Section 7-501) or a bona fide purchaser of a security (Section
8-301) and such holders or purchasers take priority over an earlier security interest
even though perfected. Filing under this Article does not constitute notice of the
security interest to such holders or purchasers.
21. Under § 1-201(32), "'Purchase' includes taking by sale, discount, negotiation,
mortgage, pledge, lien, issue or re-issue, gift or any other voluntary transaction creating
an interest in property." Under § 1-201(33), "'Purchaser' means a person who takes by
purchase."
22. (1) A security interest in chattel paper or negotiable documents may be perfected
by filing. A security interest in money or instruments (other than instruments which
constitute part of chattel paper) can be perfected only by the secured party's taking
possession, except as provided in subsections (4) and (5) of this section and sub-
sections (2) and (3) of Section 9-306 on proceeds.
(4) A security interest in instruments or negotiable documents is perfected without
filing or the taking of possession for a period of 21 days from the time it attaches to
the extent that it arises for new value given under a written security agreement.
(5) A security interest remains perfected for a period of 21 days without filing
where a secured party having a perfected security interest in an instrument, a
negotiable document or goods in possession of a bailee other than one who has
issued a negotiable document therefor
(a) makes available to the debtor the goods or documents representing the goods
for the purpose of ultimate sale or exchange or for the purpose of loading,
unloading, storing, shipping, transshipping, manufacturing, processing or other-
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ing" and "temporary perfection." Bank could not, in our example,
claim a perfected security interest in the note by virtue of either of
these modes of perfection. 23 Even if it could make such a claim, Finance
Company would have priority over such a perfected security interest:
as noted above, that is the point of § 9-308(a).
The other type of perfected interest over which Finance Company
prevails by virtue of the section is an interest in the instrument per-
fected as to proceeds under § 9-306.24 The important question, then, is
whether Bank is claiming a security interest in the note as proceeds,
or whether there is some other sort of interest as to which Bank can
assert a claim.
wise dealing with them in a manner preliminary to their sale or exchange, but
priority between conflicting security interests in the goods is subject to sub-
section (3) of Section 9-312; or
(b) delivers the instrument to the debtor for the purpose of ultimate sale or ex-
change or of presentation, collection, renewal or registration of transfer.
23. Except when instruments are treated as part of chattel paper, see 9-304(j),
quoted in note 22 supra (or when they are treated as "proceeds," a treatment discussed in
text in the next paragraph), one never perfects as to them by filing, whether "permissive"
or otherwise. Bank could therefore not claim a perfected security interest in the note as
such by virtue of a filing as to the note, even if its security agreement with Debtor and
its filed financing statement had both thrown in, out of an abundance of caution, the
words "notes and other instruments" as part of the description of the collateral. More-
over (again excepting situations in which notes are treated as proceeds), the only kind of
"temporary perfection" without possession that Bank might avail itself of would occur
during a 21-day period starting when (a) Bank's nonpossessory security interest in the
note "attaches" (see definition of that term at § 9-203(2)), and then only to the extent
that the security interest in the note arises for new value under a written security agree-
ment, see § 9-304(4); or (b) Bank, which already had a perfected security interest in the
note (as by possession), "delivers" it over to the debtor for certain limited purposes, see
§ 9-304(5). Since Bank, in our example, provided no new value to Debtor when Buyer
made the note and Debtor received it and pledged it to Finance Company, and since
Bank never delivered the note to anybody, for any purpose, Bank cannot claim a
perfected security interest in the note under some theory of "temporary perfection"
sanctioned by § 9-304.
24. Subsections (2) and (3) of § 9-306 state, regarding the perfection of proceeds:
(2) Except where this Article otherwise provides, a security interest continues in
collateral notwithstanding sale, exchange or other disposition thereof unless the dis-
position was authorized by the secured party in the security agreement or otherwise,
and also continues in any identifiable proceeds including collections received by the
debtor.
(3) The security interest in proceeds is a continuously perfected seckirity interest if
the interest in the original collateral was perfected but it ceases to be a perfected
security interest and becomes unperfected ten days after receipt of the proceeds by
the debtor unless
(a) a filed financing statement covers the original collateral and the proceeds are
collateral in which a security interest may be perfected by filing in the office
or offices where the financing statement has been filed and, if the proceeds
are acquired with cash proceeds, the description of collateral in the financing
statement indicates the types of property constituting the proceeds; or
(b) a filed financing statement covers the original collateral and the proceeds are
identifiable cash proceeds; or
(c) the security interest in the proceeds is perfected before the expiration of the
ten day period.
Except as provided in this section, a security interest in proceeds can be perfected
only by the methods or under the circumstances permitted in this Article for original
collateral of the same type.
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Section 9-306(1) defines "proceeds" to include "whatever is received
upon the sale, exchange, collection or other disposition of collateral or
proceeds. 25 The account on which Buyer was the obligor was origin-
ally Bank's "collateral": one could argue that Dealer "disposed" of the
account by demanding and receiving the note. Thus, it would appear
that Bank's equitable interest in the note is an interest in proceeds,
and is therefore subordinate to Finance Company's security interest
by virtue of § 9-308(a), even though Bank's interest was first in time
and was properly perfected.
Bank's only remaining line of argument against Finance Company
would depend upon an assertion that Finance Company's security
interest extends only to the note26 and not to the corresponding ac-
count. Bank would argue that the account perdures despite Dealer's
wrongful procuring of the note, and that Bank is claiming priority in
Dealer's abstract right against Buyer. This argument will work, of
course, only if it can be said that the abstract right and the paper right
can exist simultaneously.27 Unfortunately for Bank, definitional lan-
guage in Article 9 implies that when Buyer gave his note the account
was extinguished. Section 9-106 defines "account" to mean "any right
to payment for goods sold or leased or for services rendered which is
not evidenced by an instrument . ,,. , This means that there cannot
be an account in the UCC sense when the right to payment which
would be referred to by that term is evidenced by an instrument such
as a note. Since the resultant priority accorded Finance Company over
the earlier perfecting and equally innocent Bank would thus appear
to turn solely on the wording of a general purpose definition, it may
be wondered whether the UCC draftsmen gave much explicit thought
to the precise priority problem under discussion. As will be argued in
the final section of this article, 29 it is not at all obvious as a matter of
original policy that Finance Company ought to prevail against Bank.30
25. See § 9-306(1) (emphasis added).
26. Note that § 9-308(a), quoted in note 19 supra, speaks only of priority "over a
security interest in the chattel paper or instrument" as to which the purchaser has taken
possession (emphasis added).
27. Note that acceptance of such an argument would mean that Buyer might be held
doubly liable (to Bank on the account and to Finance Company on the note). Bank could,
of course, argue that this is simply a problem that Buyer created for himself.
28. See § 9-106 (emphasis added).
29. See pp. 474-79 infra.
30. Bank can get some comfort out of the fact that it cannot be defrauded success-
fully by Dealer if the latter exacts a note from Buyer and transfers it to a finance
company which is a cooperating affiliate of Dealer, a majority shareholder, or a creditor
seeking satisfaction of a prior debt. This is because § 9-308(a) requires that the later
secured party taking possession of the note must give new value, act in the ordinary
course, and be without knowledge of Bank's security interest in order to prevail. See §
9-308(a), quoted in note 19 supra. To put the point generally, the second secured party
452
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Our second basic line of analysis of the priority problems proceeds
from § 9-309. 31 If Finance Company not only satisfies the require-
ments of § 9-308(a), but also qualifies as a holder in due course under
§ 3-302(1),32 it can mount an argument based on § 9-309, which states
that nothing in Article 9 "limits the rights" of a holder in due course
(or certain others) and that such holders and others "take priority over
an earlier security interest even though perfected." 33 This provision
is ambiguous, however, since the "earlier security interest" referred to
might mean any earlier security interest whatsoever (yielding an absurd
result), an earlier interest in the note (leaving the answer to our
priority problem unsettled), an earlier interest in the note or in the
right which the note came to evidence (answering the question in
favor of Finance Company), or something else.34 However, since a
secured party who qualifies as a holder in due course of a note would
ordinarily qualify under § 9-308(a), 3 the indeterminacy of § 9-309 will
not often pose a serious obstacle to resolution of the kind of priority
problem raised by the example under discussion.3"
will not have priority under certain circumstances which might tend to encourage or
make possible collusion between the second secured party and the fraudulent debtor. My
focus is not on such familiar conflict-of-interest situations, but on the harder problems
posed by the paradigm in which both transferees are likely to be innocent.
31. Quoted in note 20 supra.
32. (1) A holder in due course is a holder who takes the instrument
(a) for value; and
(b) in good faith; and
(c) without notice that it is overdue or has been dishonored or of any defense
against or claim to it on the part of any person.
33. See § 9-309, quoted in note 20 supra.
34. Failure to perceive this ambiguity, together with the knee jerk response one tends
to make in favor of possessors of notes, may account for the decision in Citizens Valley
Bank v. Pacific Materials Co., 263 Ore. 557, 503 P.2d 491 (1972), where the account versus
note paradigm was resolved in favor of the notetaker with a simple, nonreflective citation
of § 9-309. It is probable that most courts would follow suit.
35. A secured party might be a holder in due course of a note and yet not qualify
under § 9-308(a). For example, a wealthy individual who takes a note as part of an
incidental lending transaction is not acting in the "ordinary course of his business" as
required by § 9-308(a). Such cases should be relatively infrequent.
36. It is interesting to consider the opposite relationship: whether, if Finance Com-
pany qualified for priority treatment under § 9-308(a), it would surely qualify under §
9-309. If so, § 9-308(a) would add anything only when the note is non-negotiable, e.g.,
the type of note referred to in § 3-805 (instruments not payable to bearer or to order). By
definition no one could then be a holder in due course of a negotiable instrument; cf.
Appendix to UCC, § 9-308, Reasons for 1972 Change. Former § 9-308 was in fact directed
only to purchasers of chattel paper and non-negotiable instruments. It was later realized
that in some circumstances a holder of a negotiable instrument was less protected than
a similarly situated holder of a non-negotiable instrument-for instance, where the holder
of the negotiable instrument did not qualify as a holder in due course (who could invoke
§ 9-309) but could qualify under § 9-308(a), were it applicable. The 1972 changes simply
made § 9-308 applicable to such a holder, thus putting him in as good a legal position
as the similarly situated holder of a non-negotiable instrument would be.
However, the non-negotiable note does not provide the only example in which a
holder qualifying under § 9-308(a) would not qualify tinder § 9-309. Finance Company
in our example comes under § 9-308(a) because, as there prescribed, it gave new value,
took possession in the ordinary course of its business, and acted "without knowledge that
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B. Share versus Stock Certificate
Imagine a mutual fund in a state that requires corporations organ-
ized under its laws to give shareholders stock certificates if they request
them, but that does not absolutely require shares to be evidenced by
certificates. The firm may very well decide, in order to reduce paper
work and the expenses of its transfer agent, never to issue certificates
unless requested to do so by a particular shareholder.37 Suppose that
such a fund issues 100 shares to Debtor and merely sends Debtor a
notification of his registration on the books of the transfer agent as a
shareholder of the firm. Debtor then grants a security interest in these
shares to an unsophisticated wealthy individual, Lender, who loans
Debtor money.
In a perfectly logical and straightforward way, Lender decides that
Debtor's shares are general intangibles within the meaning of Article
9. Section 9-106 defines "general intangibles" to mean "any personal
property (including things in action) other than goods, accounts, chattel
paper, documents, instruments, and money." The only one of these
categories under which Debtor's shares might fall is that of instruments.
Section 9-105 (1)(i) defines the term "instrument" for Article 9 pur-
poses to mean an Article 3 negotiable instrument or an Article 8
security "or any other writing which evidences a right to the payment
of money and is not itself a security agreement or lease and is of a type
which is in ordinary course of business transferred by delivery with
any necessary indorsement or assignment." The phrase "any other
writing" suggests strongly that Debtor's shares, which are not evidenced
by stock certificates, fail to qualify as an Article 9 instrument. Debtor
probably received a confirmation slip from his broker and a notice of
registration on the books of the transfer agent of the mutual fund after
his purchase, but these writings hardly qualify as instruments, given the
necessary characteristics set forth in the definition as quoted. Debtor's
certificateless shares are of course not negotiable instruments under
Article 3,38 and the Article 8 definition of a "security" is thoroughly
imbued with the presupposition that a security is a writing of some
sort-in the case of an equity security, a stock certificate. 39
the specific paper or instrument [was] subject to a security interest." It is conceivable
that, despite all this, it might nevertheless not be a holder in due course because, for
example, it had notice that the note was overdue (assuming it had been called) or dis-
honored or that the customer had some defense against it, see § 3-302(l)(c), or because in
some way it had not acted "in good faith."
37. See note 12 supra.
38. See § 3-104(1) (requirements for a negotiable instrument under Article 3).
39. See § 8-102:
(1) In this Article unless the context otherwise requires
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Suppose now that the fund, at Debtor's later request, gives Debtor a
stock certificate to represent the shares that he owns, 40 and Debtor
turns around and pledges the certificate to Bank for a contemporaneous
loan made by Bank in the ordinary course of its business. Bank, let us
assume, has no knowledge of the prior security interest in favor of
Lender. Since Bank thinks of stock-collaterized loans as always involv-
ing a pledge of stock certificates and the transfer of actual possession of
the certificates, it does not occur to Bank that Debtor might have
granted a security interest in the shares before they were evidenced by
a certificate. Accordingly, Bank makes no UCC filing search in the
office for the jurisdiction where Debtor is located, and does not find
Lender's properly filed financing statement covering Debtor's mutual
fund shares as general intangibles.
Under § 9-308(a),41 Bank, as a purchaser for new value who acted in
the ordinary course of business and had no knowledge of a prior
security interest, clearly has priority "over a security interest in the...
instrument which is perfected under Section 9-304 (permissive filing
and temporary perfection) or under Section 9-306 (perfection as to
proceeds) .... -42 Lender's interest is, of course, not one that he would
claim to have been perfected under 9-304, since there is no permissive
filing as to instruments and since the temporary perfection provisions
of § 9-30443 are here inapplicable. To the extent that it can be argued
that Debtor "disposed" of his general intangible when he requested
stock certificates to evidence his shares, the certificates could be re-
garded as "proceeds," but in this event Bank would clearly take priority
over Lender's claim to the certificates as proceeds. The question then,
as in the account versus note situation, is whether Debtor's shares, con-
sidered as general intangibles, ceased to exist when the stock certificate
was issued to Debtor.
(a) A "security" is an instrument which
(i) is issued in bearer or registered form; and
(ii) is of a type commonly dealt in upon securities exchanges or markets or com-
monly recognized in any area in which it is issued or dealt in as a medium
for investment; and
(iii) is either one of a class or series or by its terms is divisible into a class or
series of instruments; and
(iv) evidences a share, participation or other interest in property or in an enter-
prise or evidences an obligation to the issuer.
(Emphasis added.)
40. The fund may be legally obligated to give the certificate when requested. See
note 11 supra.
41. Quoted in note 19 supra.
42. Emphasis added.
43. See note 22 supra.
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From a conceptual point of view, the answer is not entirely clear.
The residual nature of the definition of "general intangibles" in §
9-10644 suggests, but does not logically imply, that the shares cannot be
categorized as general intangibles after a certificate has been issued to
their owner. It could be argued that Debtor had an interest in the
corporation, or more exactly, that his general intangible had two ele-
ments-the right to get a stock certificate and the multitude of rights
appurtenant to owning an equity interest in a corporation. The latter
bundle of rights perdures after the issuance to him of a certificate,
since the latter is only evidence of those rights. One could cite the
analogy of a security interest or an ownership interest in goods; such
an interest does not cease to exist merely because the goods are given
to a warehouseman who issues a negotiable document of title for
them.
4 5
In fact, however, it is fairly certain, given customary practices in
connection with loans for which stock is collateral and the attendant
expectations that have been generated among bankers and lawyers in
the financial community, that Bank would win as against Lender. Very
few professional lenders would regard a stock-collateralized loan as
well secured or in a priority position if the lender or his agent did not
have physical possession of stock certificates. 4" In order to fulfill these
common expectations and permit Bank to have priority over Lender a
court faced with the problem would probably decide that general in-
tangibles cease to exist when they become represented by stock certif-
icates.
An alternative solution might be to say that the general intangible
perdures after issuance of the certificate but that Bank has priority
under § 9-308(a) 47 in the certificate and the interest it represents and
that Lender maintains his status as perfected secured party with respect
to the general intangible. This would mean that both Lender and Bank
would have an equal claim upon the assets of the mutual fund. It is
difficult to believe that the issuer, which has been entirely guiltless
throughout the series of transactions, and which probably had to accede
to Debtor's request for a certificate, would be subjected to such a
double liability, and nothing in Article 8 demonstrates that it would
be so subject.48
44. Quoted at p. 454 supra.
45. See pp. 456-61 infra.
46. See Vagts, Pledges of Corporate Securities, in P. COOGAN, IV. HOGAN & D. VAGTs,
SEcuRED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE U.C.C. § 14.01[2], at 1503 (1973).
47. Quoted in note 19 supra.
48. Section 8-404 deals with the issuer's liability or nonliability for "the registration
of the transfer of a security." This would not apply to the example in the text, for
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Again, § 9-30949 might come to the aid of the holder of the paper
right if the holder qualifies-in this case, as a bona fide purchaser of
the security, that is, the certificate. If Bank has such status, then it takes
priority over "an earlier security interest even though perfected." We
noted earlier,5° however, the ambiguity in that section. The phrase
"an earlier security interest" cannot be read literally as meaning any
earlier security interest in any collateral whatsoever. The phrase could
reasonably be taken to mean "an earlier security interest in the same
collateral," in which case it is possible to argue that the collateral in
question is the Article 8 security or stock certificate, which is different
from the shares themselves. The official comments to § 9-309 do not
negate this argument, since they refer only to competing interests in
documents and instruments as such. But if we accept this view that
shares and the certificates that later evidence them are not the same
collateral, and that § 9-309's reference to the bona fide certificate
purchaser's priority over "an earlier security interest" means only a
security interest in the same collateral, then Lender's interest would
not be subordinated to Bank's by virtue of § 9-309. Under this chain of
reasoning, Lender could prevail as to his interest in the shares even if
he had filed after the certificate was issued.5' But this goes too far:
Lender's argument implies that one can always perfect a security in-
terest in shares by making a UCC filing as to general intangibles and
be protected against later pledgees of the certificates-a position which
seems thoroughly contrary to common expectation and sound com-
mercial practice.
Debtor only asked for a stock certificate, made out to himself, to represent shares he
already owned and as to which he was already the registered owner; cf. § 8-403 (limits
the issuer's duty of inquiry when a security is presented for registration, and which
seems inapplicable for similar reasons). Lender might try to invoke § 8-315(1):
Any person against whom the transfer of a security [here, the pledge to Bank] is
wrongful for any reason ... may against anyone except a bona fide purchaser reclaim
possession of the security or obtain possession of any new security evidencing all or
part of the same rights or have damages.
Yet, if this subsection applies, Bank is probably an excepted bona fide purchaser; cf. §§
8-302, 9-309 (second sentence): a UCC filing is not notice such as automatically to defeat
bona fide purchaser status. Indeed, though Comment I to § 8-315 suggests that our
priority paradigm was not what the draftsmen had in mind, § 8-315(1) literally seems to
apply and settle the question in favor of Bank.
49. Quoted in note 20 supra.
50. See p. 453 supra.
51. Note that the Code contains nothing regarding stock certificates comparable to
§ 9-304(2) regarding negotiable documents, which clearly states that while a negotiable
document is outstanding one perfects as to the underlying goods (that is, obtains a prior
and perfected position in the abstract rights) by perfecting as to the document.
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C. Interest in Goods versus Warehouse Receipt
If we apply our general priority paradigm to the case of an interest
in goods constituting equipment,52 which interest is later evidenced by
a warehouse receipt, the result is the reverse of the likely outcome in
our first two situations; here, the first secured party should prevail. (If
the collateral is inventory, however, the result is less clear; the second
secured party might arguably take priority.) This is not to say that the
warehouse receipt is not accorded a preferred legal status. Section 9-
304(2) shows that possession of this sort of paper right is quite ad-
vantageous:
During the period that goods are in the possession of the issuer of
a negotiable document therefor, a security interest in the goods is
perfected by perfecting a security interest in the document, and
any security interest in the goods otherwise perfected during such
period is subject thereto.
This means that, during the period when interests in the goods are
represented by the warehouse receipt, a secured party who attempts to
perfect his security interest in the Debtor's goods by filing as to the
goods themselves will find himself subject to the security interest of a
secured party who perfects as to the warehouse receipt, even though the
latter may have perfected his interest later in time. However, the
obvious negative implication of the double use of the word "during"
in § 9-304(2) is that a secured party who properly perfects as to the
goods themselves before they are placed in the hands of a bailee who
issues a warehouse receipt will take priority over a later perfecting
secured party who perfects via possession of the warehouse receipt.
Though this conclusion must be qualified in the case of goods con-
stituting inventory of the debtor, it is otherwise supported by the line
of analysis which starts from § 9-309.53 Section 9-309, as in the two
situations previously discussed, seems to argue for the holder of the
paper right:
Nothing in this Article limits the rights of... a holder to whom a
negotiable document of title has been duly negotiated.., and such
52. Section 9-109 states:
Goods are...
(2) "equipment" if they are used or bought for use primarily in business (including
farming or a profession) or by a debtor who is a non-profit organization or a govern-
mental subdivision or agency or if the goods are not included in the definitions of
inventory, farm products or consumer goods ....
53. Quoted in note 20 supra. Unlike the account versus note and share versus certif-
icate situations, a § 9-308(a) line of analysis not here possible. Section 9-308(a) deals only
with purchase of "instruments" and "chattel paper"; warehouse receipts are "documents."
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holders.., take priority over an earlier security interest even
though perfected. Filing under this Article does not constitute
notice of the security interest to such holders or purchasers.
As suggested above, the language of this provision is ambiguous: "An
earlier security interest" might conceivably refer to the perfected secu-
rity interest of a secured party who perfected his interest before the
goods were given to a bailee that issued a negotiable document of title
concerning them, or it might refer only to an earlier security interest
in the document. In the two previously discussed situations, one could
only note the ambiguity and make more or less convincing arguments
about its proper resolution (that the second secured party-the paper
right holder-should prevail). This resolution rested partly on the de-
sire to harmonize § 9-309 with the more demonstrable result under §
9-308(a), and might seem to imply that when § 9-309 speaks of priority
over "an earlier security interest" it must mean priority over "an
earlier security interest in the documents or instruments or in the
abstract interests which they later came to evidence." In other words,
one is tempted to see an implication that the narrow interpretation of
the "same collateral," according to which correlative abstract rights and
paper rights are separate and distinct, must be wrong. However, this
reading of § 9-309 cannot be universalized, for the narrow interpreta-
tion of "same collateral" is supported by the UCC's resolution of the
warehouse receipt situation. In this instance, § 9-309 does not have to
be read as giving priority to the later secured party over the earlier
perfecting holder of the abstract right, because a more specific UCC
provision, § 7-503(1), must be taken into account. That section states
in pertinent part:
A document of title [such as a warehouse receipt issued to a debtor
and then duly negotiated by him to a second secured party un-
aware of a pre-bailment security interest in the covered goods]
confers no right in goods against a person who before issuance of
the document had.., a perfected security interest in them and
who neither
(a) delivered or entrusted them.., to the bailor [the debtor]
... with actual or apparent authority to ship, store or sell
... or with power of disposition under this Act (Sections
2-403 and 9-307) or other statute or rule of law; nor
(b) acquiesced in the procurement by the bailor or his nominee
of any document of title.
Under § 7-503(1), then, a secured party who perfects a nonpossessory
security interest in a debtor's goods is protected from the contingency
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of a fraudulently procured document with respect to collateral which is
equipment. He can simply refuse to acquiesce in the issuance of a
document. If, as assumed by our basic priority paradigm, he does not
even know of its issuance, and later objects to it, he cannot have ac-
quiesced and will prevail against the secured party who took possession
of the paper right.54
According to Professor Gilmore,55 however, there is nothing the first
secured party can do if the collateral is inventory held by the debtor for
sale; the debtor does have "power of disposition under this Act" with
respect to the inventory. His security interest is clearly defeated when
debtor negotiates the document to a buyer in ordinary course of busi-
ness, and an argument-wrong, I believe-can be made that it is de-
feated when debtor negotiates it to a second secured party who takes the
paper right as security for a loan.56
It is therefore clear that the phrase "an earlier security interest" in
§ 9-309 does not mean the same thing in all of the cases affected by that
54. It perhaps requires some explanation to understand in adequate detail the ap-
plication of § 7-503(1). Suppose that Debtor grants a security interest in goods to Bank,
which promptly perfects by filing on January 1. On February 2, Debtor wrongfully bails
the goods with a warehouseman who issues a negotiable warehouse receipt for them. On
February 4, Debtor "duly negotiates" the warehouse receipt as prescribed in § 7-501(4)
to Finance Company, which takes possession of the receipt as security for a contemporane-
ous loan to Debtor.
Section 7-503(1) states in effect that the warehouse receipt, whether in the hands of
Debtor or in the hands of Finance Company, confers no right in the goods superior to
Bank's security interest if Bank did not do certain things, such as "entrusting" the goods to
Debtor (the "bailor") with power of disposition under §§ 2-403 and 9-307 or "acquiescing"
in Debtor's procurement of the warehouse receipt. The apparent negative implication is
that if Bank did do either of these things, Finance Company's security interest would
have priority over Bank's earlier perfected security interest.
It is therefore crucial to determine whether Bank did any of the things mentioned in
subsections (a) and (b) of § 7-503(1). I assume throughout that Bank did not acquiesce in
Debtor's procurement of the warehouse receipt, so that Bank will not be subordinated to
Finance Company on this score. The various activities mentioned in subsection (a) all
seem inapplicable to anything Bank did, with the possible exception of an "entrusting"
of the goods to Debtor "with power of disposition under this Act (Sections 2-403 and
9-307)." "Entrusting" is defined in § 2-403(3) to include inter alia "any acquiescence in
retention of possession...." It appears clear, then, that in the defined sense Bank did
"entrust" to Debtor the goods serving as collateral for its loan to Debtor, since it did not
insist on taking possession of the collateral. The next question is whether the goods were
entrusted to Debtor "with power of disposition under this Act (Sections 2-403 and 9-307)"
and, as a reading of the cited sections indicates, this depends in essence on whether the
goods were "inventory" (§ 9-109(4)) to Debtor.
Thus, if the goods in question were not inventory but equipment (§ 9-109(2)), Bank
will not have done any of the things specified in subsections (a) and (b) of § 7-503(l)
and it will have priority over Finance Company, the holder of the paper right.
55. 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 166 (1965).
56. The situation when the goods are inventory is difficult because of the peculiar
wording of § 7-503(l). To revert to the example described in note 54 infra, Finance Com-
pany will obviously argue that Debtor had power of disposition over the inventory, since
under §§ 2-403(2) and 9-307(1) it could have transferred good title superior to Bank's
interest to a "buyer in the ordinary course of business," and so Finance Company's
security interest in the document should have priority over Bank's security interest in
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section. It cannot be argued that the phrase per se implies that a
favored secured party taking possession of a paper right will have
priority over an earlier perfected security interest in the underlying
abstract right before the latter became "paperized." This conclusion
holds in the account versus note and shares versus certificate situations,
but not in the interest in goods versus warehouse receipt situation-at
least when the goods are equipment-and in each case the result flows
not from the wording of § 9-309 but from other Code provisions and
policies.
D. Interest in Goods versus Chattel Paper
Suppose that Seller sells goods to Buyer on a conditional sale basis,
and gets Buyer to sign a security agreement which simply recites that
Buyer is granting a security interest in the specified goods in favor of
Seller "for value received." Assume that the quoted reference is vague
enough so that the paper copy of the security agreement which is ob-
tained by Seller does not constitute "a writing or writings which
evidence both a monetary obligation and a security interest in or lease
of specific goods ... ," and is therefore not "chattel paper" within the
meaning of § 9-105(l)(b). 57 Seller then assigns his rights against Buyer
to Bank. Since Seller has perfected its security interest against Buyer
by a proper filing of a financing statement, on which is noted the as-
signment to Bank, Bank realizes that under § 9-302(2)58 it need do
nothing further in order to keep itself perfected as against creditors of
and transferees from the original debtor, Buyer. But, being cautiously
concerned with the possibility of Seller's bankruptcy, Bank pays partic-
ular attention to comment 7 to § 9-302(2) in the 1972 official text of
the UCC:
the goods. Bank will reply that in fact Debtor attempted to dispose of the goods, not to a
buyer in the ordinary course of business, but to Finance Company, which is a "purchaser"
(see §§ 1-201(32) , (33)) but not a "buyer in ordinary course of business" (see § 1-2 01(9))
within the meaning of the UCC definitions. It will contend that § 7-503(l) did not mean
to give Finance Company a priority over Bank's own earlier perfected security interest
simply because Debtor could have defeated Bank's rights in the goods by transferring the
warehouse receipt to a buyer in ordinary course. The only negative inference properly to
be drawn from the subsection, it will say, is that it is helpless against such buyers. Since
I believe that the policy reasons developed in the next section, see pp. 467-68 infra, to
support priority for the first secured party who takes an interest in equipment apply with
equal or greater force to a first secured party taking an interest in inventory, I think it
desirable that Bank's arguments should be accepted and those of Finance Company re-
jected.
57. See note 8 supra (text of § 9-105(l)(b)) (emphasis added).
58. If a secured party assigns a perfected security interest, no filing under this
Article is required in order to continue the perfected status of the security interest'
against creditors of and transferees from the original debtor.
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Buyer buys goods from Seller who obtains a security interest in
them which he perfects. Seller assigns the perfected security in-
terest to X.... If. .. the assignment from Seller to X was itself
intended for security (or was a sale of accounts or chattel paper),
X must take whatever steps may be required for protection in
order to be protected against Seller's transferees and creditors.
The comment seems to say only that if the assignment to Bank was
intended as security, or was a sale of accounts or chattel paper, a per-
fecting action against Seller is necessary. This seems to leave open the
possibility that an outright assignment without recourse (that is, a
"sale") of all of Seller's rights (including its security) against Buyer
would not require Bank to take any perfecting action. However, Bank
is concerned that the transaction, even if so structured as an outright
sale, would at least be analyzable as including a sale of Buyer's mone-
tary obligation, which obligation could be classified as an account,"0
and so Bank decides to be as safe as possible by making a proper UCC
filing against Seller as debtor, with itself listed as secured party.
Suppose now that Seller imposes upon Buyer to make a "clerical
clarification" of the following form: Buyer types on Seller's executed
copy of the security agreement the words, "The security interest
created by this security agreement is intended to secure Buyer's mone-
tary obligation, created by a loan from Seller to Buyer on December
10, 1974, to pay $9,000 to Seller, which obligation Buyer hereby ac-
knowledges and ratifies." The insert is dated and signed by Buyer.
Seller then takes the security agreement and delivers it to Finance
Company as security for a contemporaneous loan by the latter to Seller.
Seller later goes into bankruptcy, and the issue is whether Finance Com-
pany or Bank has priority in Seller's right against Buyer.
The analytical problem will seem quite familiar by this time. Under
§ 9-308(a),10 Finance Company is literally given priority over other
security interests in the chattel paper, but nothing explicit is said about
priority over an earlier perfected abstract security interest which later
became embodied in or evidenced by the specific chattel paper in ques-
tion. Bank does not claim perfection by temporary or permissive filing,
nor does it claim an interest in the chattel paper proceeds-or if it does,
it is bound to lose. Bank is rather claiming that it is assignee of a
secured party and that it has a properly perfected security interest in
Buyer's goods themselves, or at least in the entire bundle of Seller's
rights against Buyer.
59. See note 9 supra (UCC definition of an "account").
60. Quoted in note 19 supra.
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As in the case of the loan secured by stock collateral, and unlike the
case of the secured financing based first on an account and then on a
note,01 the definition of the relevant paper right (here, chattel paper)
does not logically imply the view that the correlative but prior abstract
right was extinguished when the paper right began to evidence it, and
therefore a strict, literal reading of § 9-308(a) does not tell us who
prevails as between Bank and Finance Company. But unlike the case
of the loan based on stock collateral, where commercial practice dic-
tated that priority be given the holder of the paper right, there does
not appear to be so strong a sense of customary practices and expecta-
tions which could be invoked to lead to a solution considered right by
nearly everyone.
If, then, the abstract right continues to exist and § 9-308(a) therefore
does not answer the priority problem, resort must be had to the general
priority sections, § 9-301 and § 9-312. Section 9-301 deals in pertinent
part with conflicts between perfected secured parties and unperfected
secured parties both having interests in the same collateral.62 This sec-
tion could be relevant if one were to say that "paperizing" a right
creates new and distinct collateral, giving Bank a security interest in
one batch of collateral, the goods as they are in the hands of Buyer,
and Finance Company a perfected security interest in another item of
collateral, Seller's chattel paper. Finance Company has priority as to
its security interest in the chattel paper, since Bank claims an interest
in the chattel paper, if it claims one at all, as proceeds and is thus sub-
ordinate to Finance Company by virtue of § 9-308(a). But, so the
argument goes, this does Finance Company very little good in this
situation. Bank has priority under § 9-301 as to its security interest in
the goods themselves since it is perfected as to the goods and Finance
Company is not perfected as to the goods as such.
The problem with this reasoning is that Finance Company's security
interest in the chattel paper has value only because it represents a
61. The warehouse receipt situation is not mentioned here because, as stated in note
53 supra, § 9-308 does not apply to "documents" like warehouse receipts.
62. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (2), an unperfected security interest
is subordinate to the rights of
(a) persons entitled to priority under Section 9-312;
(b) a person who becomes a lien creditor before the security interest is perfected;
(c) in the case of goods, instruments, documents, and chattel paper, a person who
is not a secured party and who is a trinsferee in bulk or other buyer not in
ordinary course of business or is a buyer of farm products in ordinary course
of business, to the extent that he gives value and receives delivery of the col-
lateral without knowledge of the security interest and before it is perfected;
(d) in the case of accounts and general intangibles, a person who is not a secured
party and who is a transferee to the extent that he gives value without knowl-
edge of the security interest and before it is perfected.
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security interest in the goods themselves. It is therefore practically
necessary for us to say that, as in the case of the warehouse receipt, one
perfects as to the goods by perfecting as to the chattel paper after the
latter has been created. This is so even though Article 9 does not state
the proposition in so many words.
However, none of this really helps Finance Company. Granted that
it has a perfected security interest in the goods by virtue of its per-
fected security interest in the chattel paper, how does this indirect
security interest in the goods stack up against Bank's earlier, perfected,
direct security interest in the goods? Since no other UCC provision
seems to settle the dispute, reference must be had to the residual
priority rule of § 9-312(5). 68 That section does not distinguish between
direct and indirect security interests in goods, so there is no reason to
believe that it is not applicable. Under its rule, Bank, being first in
time to perfect, clearly prevails over Finance Company.
4
E. Summary
The results of our inquiry may be summarized. In the case of the
account later converted to a note, one can feel fairly certain that the
innocent later perfecting secured party who takes possession of the
note will prevail over the earlier perfecting and equally innocent
secured party who filed as to the account. In the case of the certificate-
less shares that later became evidenced by a stock certificate, a strict,
close reading of the UCC's provisions does not logically imply the
proper solution, but general expectations in the financial community
lead one to predict that the later perfecting party who took possession
of the stock certificate would prevail over the equally innocent and
earlier perfecting secured party who simply made a UCC filing as to
63. In all cases not governed by other rules stated in this section (including cases
of purchase money security interests which do not qualify for the special priorities
set forth in subsections (3) and (4) of this section), priority between conflicting
security interests in the same collateral shall be determined according to the follow-
ing rules:
(a) Conflicting security interests rank according to priority in time of filing or
perfection. Priority dates from the time a filing is first made covering the col-
lateral or the time the security interest is first perfected, whichever is earlier,
provided that there is no period thereafter when there is neither filing nor
perfection.
(b) So long as conflicting security interests are unperfected, the first to attach has
priority.
Note that the 1962 text, though differently stated, would have the same result because
"priority between conflicting security interests in the same collateral shall be determined
as follows: ... (b) in the order of perfection unless both were perfected by filing, regard-
less of which security interest attached first..." § 9-312(5) (1962 Official Text).
64. Note that § 9-309 does not apply at all to chattel paper, though it did enter into
the discussion of each of the other three exemplifications of the priority paradigm.
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the certificateless shares considered as general intangibles. In the case
of the equipment turned over to a warehouse, the later perfecting
secured party who takes possession of the warehouse receipt loses to
the equally innocent earlier perfecting secured party who filed during
the pre-bailment period as to the equipment itself. If the bailed goods
are inventory the outcome is arguably, though perhaps regrettably, 65
the opposite. Finally, in the case of the abstract security interest in
goods which later became evidenced by chattel paper, neither the
logic of the UCC itself nor any easily recognizable general expectations
give us firm assurance that we have the answer. A rather policy in-
different analysis of the UCC provisions supports the argument that
the earlier perfecting secured party who was assigned the abstract
security interest should prevail over the later perfecting secured party
who took possession of the chattel paper, but, given the latitude pos-
sible in interpreting § 9-308(a), the conclusion is hardly inevitable.
II. Evaluation of the Four Patterns of Priority
The preceding analysis treated the UCC as a given, self-contained
system of formal principles that can be logically manipulated to pro-
duce answers to specific problems. The present section explores policy
considerations that help one to understand, justify, and criticize the
results of the four priority problems that would apparently be reached
under the current UCC.
The following discussion assumes that it is desirable for a legal sys-
tem to reduce as much as possible various costs which impede the flow
of commerce. For convenience, I will distinguish kinds of costs. The
irritations, inefficiencies, and injustices that result from frauds I will
refer to as "fraud costs." Costs created by the lack, most apparent in
purely oral agreements, of a fixed66 and uniquely embodied or located
verbal formulation of rights I will describe as "unfixity costs.""
65. See note 56 supra.
66. A formulation may be "fixed" in memory even in a system of totally abstract
rights. However, since memory is finite and may shift over time, and since memories may
differ among persons, the society which rests on the fixation of rights in memory faces
grave difficulties when commercial life evolves to a point which demands that numerous
and complicated transactions take place in a speedy and reliable way. See p. 474 infra.
67. I apologize for the barbaric phrase, though I would point out that "unfixity" is
not a neologism. See 2 THE COMPAcT EDITION OF THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 3504
(1971). An apparent alternative, "uncertainty costs," has connotations that I wish to avoid:
Statisticians, financial theorists, and economists will think rather of uncertainty about
future states of affairs. "Ambiguity costs" would simply be insufficient; for example,
though one consequence of the nonfixation of legal rights may well be that understand-
ings of rights are ambiguous, another may be that the parties' understandings of their
rights shift perceptibly over time-a process which does not necessarily imply that the
original understandings of the rights were unclear.
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Examples of unfixity costs are the costs of uncertainty, confusion, dis-
agreement, shifts in understanding and memory, and a general tend-
ency toward neglect of precision and detail. 8
Let us first reexamine the two priority problems which have the
clearest solutions. In the account versus note example, priority was
awarded to the holder of the paper right, even though he came later in
time; in the interest in goods versus warehouse receipt example in-
volving collateral that was equipment, priority was given to the first
secured party even though he took an abstract right. Why do these two
solutions differ?
There is little difference between the two situations in the matter of
reducing unfixity costs. In both situations, both secured parties took
roughly equivalent steps to reduce unfixity costs: the first secured
party satisfied the Statute of Frauds in each case, and the second secured
party took possession of a fairly standardized paper right.09
A different perspective on unfixity costs is suggested, however, if
one attends to whether the various secured parties took interests in a
tangible or intangible right. Perhaps because of widespread psycho-
logical preferences, abstract rights in intangibles call for and receive a
more definitive and legally favored fixation in paper form than do
abstract rights in tangibles. Put another way, people generally seem
to want paper rights in intangibles more than they want paper rights
in tangibles, and this may lead them to insist that paper rights in in-
tangibles, such as notes, embody or be identified with the correlative
abstract right, to such an extent that the symbol becomes psychological-
68. A few comments on the distinction between fraud co~ts and unfixity costs may
prevent some misunderstandings. First, I recognize that the two categories overlap. One
of the costs of unfixity may be the facilitation of fraud: the Statute of Frauds is a
perfect example of belief that unfixity furthers fraud. However, fraud is facilitated by
many things other than unfixity, e.g., by child-rearing practices that reward cunning and
deviousness; fraud may be reduced by means that do not involve reducing unfixity.
Moreover, fraud is such a predominant theme in commercial law that I have thought it
best to treat fraud costs as a separate category. Second, I speak of fraud "costs" and un-
fixity "costs" because the term "costs" connotes measurability in principle and suggests
that there are efficient and inefficient ways to reduce fraud and unfixity. A legal system
should not simply minimize fraud, it should do so cheaply; what is wanted is a reduction
in net fraud costs. Third, as will become apparent in the textual discussion, I do not
mean to imply that fraud costs and unfixity costs can be meaningfully monetized. I doubt
that all consequences of fraud, or of the nonfixation of legal rights, which can o~lausibly
be regarded as unfortunate, unpleasant, disruptive, dysfunctional, or the like, can, given
the present structure and functioning of our economy, be accurately expressed in dollars
and cents. In particular, the basically dysfunctional nature of the nonfixation of legal
rights is better grasped from a psychological than an economic standpoint. Though
psychological needs unsatisfied by abstract ("unfixed") rights may have gradually called
forth commercial practices to satisfy those needs, it would be difficult to detect a reflec-
tion of these needs in prices.
69. Note that the Statute of Frauds is now incorporated in the UCC, see, e.g., § 9-
203(l)(a), while the UCC also sets forth the basic scheme of paper rights now used in
commercial practice. See, e.g., Article 3.
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ly equivalent to the thing symbolized.70 If so, it becomes natural to
expect that the later perfecting secured party will win in the situations
involving intangible rights represented by the note, while the earlier
perfecting secured party will win in the situations involving goods as
to which interests were later evidenced by a warehouse receipt. But
apart from the rather ethereal psychological benefits just hypothesized,
it is difficult to perceive how the policy of reducing unfixity costs in-
dicates that there ought to be such a difference in treatment between
holders of instruments, on the one hand, and holders of documents on
the other. If Article 9 were intended to make such a clear-cut dichot-
omy, the mixed-up treatment of instruments, documents, and chattel
paper in §§ 9-308(a) and 9-309 certainly obscures that intention.
It is more illuminating to consider the relative abilities of the first
secured parties to reduce fraud costs cheaply by protecting themselves.
In the warehouse receipt case, it would hardly be fair to tell the first
secured party that he should write all warehouses that might conceiv-
ably deal with his debtor and tell them not to issue a warehouse receipt
to the debtor, or alternatively, to note the secured party's interest on
any receipts that were to be issued. Such a task would be indeterminate,
and would be especially unfair if, as has been supposed, the secured
party had not the slightest idea that his debtor would bail the goods
or if the relevant security agreement prohibited such bailment.
By contrast, it is more feasible for a bank entering into a general
accounts receivable financing agreement with a dealer to write all the
account debtors and tell them not to give the debtor a note evidencing
their account obligations. Depending upon the kind of accounts re-
ceivable arrangement in question, this task of notification might be
extremely burdensome and impractical, but at least the number of
debtors would be limited and knowable, and notification might have
some practical, if not legal, advantage. It seems fair in this situation to
give the bank the problem of trading off between the expenses of
notification and the risks attendant upon failure to notify the members
of this defined class of account debtors.
71
70. See Vagts, supra note 46, § 14.0112], at 1503.
71. It should be observed that in the account versus note situation, notification or
lack of it may have roughly the same consequences as in the warehouse receipt situation,
with respect to the first secured party's prospects for obtaining payment from the note-
makers or the warehouseman. Without notification to the warehouseman, the first secured
party cannot force the warehouseman who acts in good faith to make payment to it on
account of a delivery of goods to the rival secured party, see § 7-404; without properly
worded notification to the account debtors, the first secured party cannot later argue that
those account debtors should have to pay it the amount of the former accounts if they
have made payment of the notes to the second secured party.
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Furthermore, in the existing world of secured financing, arrange-
ments sort themselves out in a way that reduces the severity of the
problem faced by the bank. Banks and finance companies entering into
accounts receivable financing arrangements with wholesalers and re-
tailers often do not require hypothecated accounts to be evidenced by
notes for precisely the same reasons that a later, wholesale, and fraud-
ulent conversion of the accounts to notes would be difficult to execute
and conceal: the accounts are numerous, the amounts owing on them
are frequently being added to and paid down, account debtors are
added and dropped, and the account debtors' geographical location,
attitudes, and willingness to cooperate may be diverse. In cases where
fraud is more feasible-as where a bank loans money to a corporate
parent partly on the security of a number of intercorporate debts owed
by subsidiaries to the parent-it is less burdensome to demand that the
bank, if it wants the greatest degree of legal protection, make sure that
promissory notes are given to evidence the debt and are pledged to it.
The solutions of the two priority problems are confirmed when one
turns to a consideration of what the second secured parties can do in
each case to prevent fraud upon themselves. The warehouse receipt
case is easy. The second secured party could, without much cost or
expense to itself, make a UCC filing search, discover the prior security
interest in the bailed equipment, and thus prevent a fraud upon itself.
Thus the solution to the problem, that the comparatively defenseless
first secured party should have priority, is just.7 2
In the case of the accounts later converted to notes, the reasoning
is somewhat more complex. It is true that putting a potential second
secured party, who would like to take possession of notes held by his
debtor, to the task of making a filing search for security interests in
accounts would not itself impose a great cost on him. However, the
information discovered by the filing search is likely to be inadequate. 73
72. One might think that priority for the first secured party is also supported in
terms of a general "first in time, first in right" principle, traces of which are embodied
in the UCC (see, e.g., § 9-312(5)). As explained at p. 475 infra, I believe that this prin-
ciple per se has minimal independent significance as a justification for a particular
resolution of a priority dispute. In a particular manifestation, e.g., "first to file, first in
right," the principle may have significant justificatory force because it states a rule
that arguably tends to reduce fraud costs, or that tends to achieve other valuable ob-
jectives.
73. A related but minor point may be made. The second secured party in the ac-
count versus note situation would only be searching the filing records to obtain informa-
tion that might prevent the very particular and not terribly common form of fraud
involving conversion of accounts to notes, since one cannot perfect security interests in
instruments per se by filing. In the warehouse receipt situation, the second secured party
might have been making a filing search for other purposes: There might be a prior
security interest in the document which he would as a practical matter like to know about,
even though his perfection by taking possession of the document would create a prior
interest.
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In the case of a debtor with many account debtors, the financing state-
ment filed by the first secured party typically would state simply that
it covers all past and future accounts receivable of the debtor. Even if
the second secured party pursues the matter and obtains a copy of the
original security agreement, he will likely find only the same descrip-
tion. To satisfy himself, he will therefore have to contact all the makers
of the notes being proffered to him as collateral, and ask for informa-
tion about whether the notes were given to evidence previously existing
accounts which arose during a period covered by the financing state-
ment of the first secured party and which fit within its terms. This
information might or might not be supplied by the makers of the
notes, and might or might not require independent verification.
By contrast, the worried first secured party could have protected
himself by simply notifying the account debtor of the debtor's assign-
ment of the accounts to himself; he need not have gone through the
expense and uncertainty of prodding the account debtors into making
affirmative responses to his requests for information, and then evaluat-
ing those responses, as the second secured party would. The entire
process of inquiry and verification by the second secured party would
be costly and, more importantly, in the great number of cases in which
proposed debtors are not fraudulent it would yield no information that
would change the second secured party's proposed course of action.
Considering these burdens, the policy of shifting the risk of a con-
version of accounts into notes to the first secured party and giving
priority to the second secured party seems wise. The contrasting results
in the account versus note and the interest in goods versus warehouse
receipt cases set out in the first section of this article are thus de-
fensible.74
The result in the certificateless share versus stock certificate example,
that the secured party taking the paper right prevails, may be con-
sidered next. The result, as suggested before, may be justified by ref-
erence to general expectations: Anyone having any experience with
loans secured by stock collateral would have little sympathy for the
plight of a secured lender who is so inexpert as not to require physical
delivery of the certificates themselves, either to himself or to some
trusted agent or third party. This may reflect the psychological pref-
erence for reducing unfixity costs by the use of paper rights when in-
tangibles like shares are at issue.
74. Another explanation, if not a justification, of the different results in the two
cases may be that warehouse receipts have simply not yet risen to the preferred legal
status that the more common promissory note has.
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Fraud costs could likewise be most easily reduced by the first secured
party in view of current practices; few, if any, secured parties file as to
general intangibles in the case of a stock-collateralized loan, and few
would think to check for such filings before making a loan. If the
proposed debtor holds certificateless shares, it is still an easy matter to
require him to ask the issuing company for a certificate which could
then be pledged.7 5 Here again, the result derived in the earlier dis-
cussion of the priority paradigm seems correct.
In the example involving an interest in goods versus chattel paper,
the first perfecting party was given priority under § 9-312(5), the
residual priority section.70 This solution is the most difficult of the
four to evaluate, perhaps because chattel paper does not have quite the
same legal dignity as negotiable instruments and because the particular
example posed is less common. The UCC's definition of "chattel
paper" 77 is so extensive as to include almost any written security agree-
ment that would arise in normal practice, so that it will be unusual to
find a situation in which an abstract security interest is later converted
into chattel paper and then conveyed to a different secured party.
Nevertheless, the example is of great theoretical interest.
To explore its implications, we begin by considering unfixity costs.
By hypothesis, the chattel paper contains more information in paper-
ized form than did the security agreement which merely evidenced the
abstract right and satisfied the Statute of Frauds, since the latter gave
75. However, the current received learning will turn out to be an inappropriate bias
as the stock market becomes more and more based on devices designed to eliminate
certificates. It is somewhat paradoxical that, in recent extensive discussions of the certifi-
cateless society, there is little mention of the secured loan problems that will be created:
most of the current discussion is focused on the simple situation of buying and selling.
See, e.g., Potter & McLean, Introduction to Book Entry Transfer of Securities, 28 Bus.
LAw. 209 (1972); S. Robins, IV. Werner, C. Johnson & A. Greenwald, Paper Crisis in the
Securities Industry-Is the Stock Certificate Necessary?, 1969 (report prepared by Lybrand,
Ross Bros., & Montgomery). But see Coogan, The New UCC Article 9, 86 HARv. L. REv.
558-63 (1973) (discussion of security problems associated with the certificateless society).
In any event, in a certificateless society there would be no reason to give priority to a
later perfecting secured party who managed to induce his debtor to convert his certifi-
cateless rights into paper rights. It is equally clear that the present scheme of Article 9
could not be made workable for a certificateless society merely by making it clear that
such a secured party loses to a secured party who earlier filed as to the shares considered
as "general intangibles." A filing as to general intangibles is made in a location determined
by the residence of the debtor. This is perfectly absurd in the case of interests in corpora-
tions, all of which either have a registrar and a transfer agent within the corporation
itself or outside of it. The most natural focus for recording all interests of every sort in
shares in a corporation is on the same records which are used to determine voting and
dividend rights, namely, records kept by the transfer agent. Either Article 8 or Article 9,
or both, would have to be amended to provide for a more rational system.
In the meantime, notifying the issuing corporation of a security interest will only
serve, if anything, as a way of speeding up an anticipated perfection by possession; cf.
Heinecke Instruments Co. v. Block, 14 UCC RFP. S R v. 167 (D. Ore. 1974).
76. Quoted in note 63 supra.
77. Quoted in note 8 supra.
470
HeinOnline  -- 84 Yale L.J. 470 1974-1975
Abstract Rights versus Paper Rights
no information about the monetary obligation being secured. The
reduction of unfixity costs achieved by chattel paper thus suggests giv-
ing priority to the second secured party.
This conclusion is not contradicted by an examination of who can
most cheaply reduce fraud costs. Since our particular situation (a most
unusual one) involves highly complex considerations of fraud costs, it
will be helpful first to examine a variant priority problem that is
clearly settled by § 9-308(a). Suppose that no abstract right was in-
volved and that the debtor gave the first secured party a security in-
terest in (though not possession of) chattel paper. If the first secured
party files, fraud on the second secured party will in fact be prevented
if the second secured party makes a filing search. But he will probably
not make such a search, because if he takes possession of the chattel
paper, he will prevail under § 9-308(a) over the first secured party
unless he has knowledge of the latter's security interest. Indeed, since
knowledge in the Code means only actual knowledge and does not
include the constructive notice created by a filing, the second secured
party has a positive incentive not to make a filing search. A fraudulent
second transfer is thus quite possible, and under § 9-308(a), which gives
the second party priority, the first secured party will clearly suffer the
consequences.
Is this rule sound? If the rule were the opposite, according priority
to the first secured party to file, the second secured party would be
motivated to make a filing search, thus nipping fraud in the bud.
Moreover, this opposite rule would make it pointless for the debtor to
attempt fraud-as he could under the § 9-308(a) rule-by passing off a
copy of the chattel paper as the original to a second secured party;
under a first-to-file rule, the second secured party would not rely on
getting possession of chattel paper but would check thefiling records
and thus discover what was about to happen.
But the first secured party has his own means of preventing fraud.
He can always protect himself by filing and taking possession, without
incurring great additional expense. The only possibility of fraud then
left open would be the debtor's passing off a copy of the chattel paper
to a second secured party as the original-which might be thought an
acceptable risk. Even if the type of financing involved is such that
dealers are customarily left in possession of the chattel paper-for ex-
ample, because the dealer is a better bill collector than the financer
and having the paper facilitates his collection efforts-the first secured
party can take steps to assure that each original copy of a piece of
chattel paper is stamped with a notice that it has been transferred as
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security. If this plan is implemented, it will give actual knowledge to
the potential second secured party and will thus reduce the possibility
of fraud. In summary, although according priority to the second
secured party under § 9-308(a) is at first blush surprising in light of
the policy of reducing fraud costs, it is not obviously or drastically
wrong, because of the ease with which the first secured party can take
possession of the chattel paper.
In this light, the priority problem involving the abstract security
interest later converted into chattel paper becomes more tractable. In
the previous example, a first secured party took as collateral not a
mere abstract right but chattel paper; yet he merely filed as to it. He
was subordinated to a later secured party who took possession of the
chattel paper without making a filing search. A fortiori a second
secured party should also prevail over a first secured party who merely
files as to the unconverted abstract right.
This outcome under § 9-308(a) is, admittedly, ambiguous with re-
spect to fraud costs. It can perhaps be best understood as an attempt to
encourage paperization of rights and a consequent reduction of un-
fixity costs by penalizing the possessor of the merely abstract right.7s
The reduction of unfixity costs, with the priority this entails for the
second secured party in the situation, is thus the determinative factor
in the example involving an interest in goods versus chattel paper; it
leads one to conclude, albeit hesitantly, that the first party priority
deduced from § 9-312(5) in the previous section is incorrect.7°
78. One should bear in mind that the first secured party's position is not like that
of the first secured party in the warehouse receipt situation, the other situation in which
tangible goods are at issue. The latter has no idea as to whatwarehouseman the goods
might be turned over by the debtor in exchange for a paper right, nor is it economically
sensible for anyone to insist that the possibilities be fixed by having the debtor bail the
goods to a warehouseman for the mere purpose of preventing a fraudulent future bail-
ment. In the chattel paper situation, by contrast, the first secured party can easily know
the specific identity of the obligor, the ultimate creator of the security interest being
assigned, and it is not unfeasible or inconvenient to insist that the right be made into
chattel paper, and then possessed or stamped by the secured party. This simply involves
having the ultimate obligor sign a slightly different-and, indeed, more common-type of
form.
79. This conclusion obviously is based on my feeling that a residual decisional rule, §
9-312(5), should not carry the day if other considerations point toward priority for the
second secured party. There are two other factors which might be of some relevance in
evaluating this situation. First, a conceivable reason for awarding priority to the first
party would be that the result would create a kind of parity with the result of the ware-
house receipt situation, which from a psychological point of view is analogous because
both involve rights in tangible goods. To the extent that analogous situations receive
similar legal treatment, the relevant legal rules will become more widely known and
protective action oriented around their existence is more likely to occur. This argument
seems, however, to be so general as to deserve only slightly more weight than a primarily
arbitrary decisional rule like the first-in-time principle of § 9-312(5).
Second, if one considers the parties from the point of view of fairness, that is, in light
of the relative strength and validity of their expectations, the scales seem evenly balanced.
Since the kind of situation I hypothesize is uncommon, it is reasonable to suppose that
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III. General Considerations: The Evolution of the Tendency to Sup-
press Abstraction
Having struggled through the statutory labyrinth and walked the
dusty sidewalks of policy, we may be permitted a romp through the
woods of general theory.
The most interesting thing about the priority paradigm is not the
intrinsic obscurity of the UCC solutions to the four problems or the
policies behind the different patterns, but the striking way in which
the different patterns raise questions about the general framework of
ideas in Article 9. In this section, some of the policies just used in
evaluating the UCC's patterns of priority will themselves be considered
in a more systematic account of the various theoretical principles in-
volved. The principal objective is not to shed any more light on the
four priority problems or to make their justification or criticism more
solid. It is simply to obtain a better theoretical understanding of the
differing principles in Article 9. Such an understanding, besides hint-
ing at a variety of sociological hypotheses, may make us more critical
in detecting and keeping in perspective biases present in the Code
itself as well as in legal arguments about its proper interpretation.
As is evident from the four patterns of priority discussed above, the
Code does not always provide that the secured party who files, even
if he files before anyone else perfects, should prevail. Instead, the law
often displays a strong preference in these and other situations for
paper rights as against earlier established, correlative, abstract rights.
In order to understand why this is so, let us imagine first a society
in which all rights are abstract. Though individual human beings have
definite and legally recognizable rights to the use and disposition of
various pieces of property, none of the rights is evidenced by a piece of
paper or in any public or private recording or filing system.80 In
such a society, consider the class of rights that concern property (or
complexly and indirectly defined pools of property) not in the physical
the first secured party would not expect the subsequent conversion of the abstract right
into a paper right and its fraudulent transfer to another party. Correlatively, however,
there need be nothing in the paper right or in the context to lead the second secured
party to suspect that it was taking possession of the converted form of an already trans-
ferred abstract right.
80. There could be various degrees of departure from this extreme. For present pur-
poses, a society's rights could be said to become "less" abstract by virtue of any one or
more of the following: an increase in the relative frequency of rights evidenced by
pieces of paper (or in some other permanent medium); an increase in the extent to which
certain rights are regarded as identified with particular pieces of paper, for which copies
are no substitute; and an increase in the number or kind of cases in which access to or
the location of such single paper rights is legally controlled.
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possession of the individuals having the rights.81 A potential transferee
may not trust the transferor as a source of evidence: The transferor
may be lying; he may have the right but be confused as to the various
subtle details of its nature; he may have a faulty memory; he may have
told a different story to someone else; and so forth. Perhaps most im-
portantly, even if he tries earnestly to describe his right accurately and
in detail, his mode of description may vary from one occasion to the
next. This shifting and variable characterization of the right is im-
portant, for in many unforeseen conflict situations a fixed verbal
formula interpreted principally in accordance with the customary legal
or ordinary meanings given to its component words may be the only,
or at least the best, way to resolve the conflict in a neutral and equitable
manner.
The fear that the potential transferor may be lying can be mitigated
to some extent by getting other individuals to vouch for his ownership
of the right. But this procedure is inconvenient. The voucher must
both be in a position to know of the transferor's right and be known
to or accepted by the transferee as a credible informant. Given a certain
common level of need for such vouching, the possible participants in
many commercial transactions would be restricted to those persons who
have a nexus of personal connections to a satisfactory voucher. Such a
system would be economically inefficient, since it needlessly curtails
the range of feasible exchange transactions. Moreover, even the state-
ments of an earnest and credible voucher have the same defects as the
transferor's statements: His descriptions of the right will tend not to
have a fixed formulation.
For the sake of simplicity, one might categorize the various irrita-
tions and inefficiencies of a system of totally abstract rights under the
two major headings that were previously introduced: "fraud costs"
created by the occurrence of the fraudulent transactions which are
permitted by this system, and "unfixity costs" created by the lack of a
fixed and uniquely embodied or located verbal formulation of the
rights.
Because of the inadequacies and costs of the abstract holding of
rights, there will naturally be pressures in a legal system to reduce or
eliminate this kind of abstraction. A variety of doctrines and devices for
facilitating and encouraging the reduction of abstraction, or at least
the costs of abstraction, will tend to evolve.
81. In all of the four examples of the priority paradigm, of course, the debtor of the
two secured parties did not have physical possession of the disputed property.
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For example, in a system of totally abstract rights a principle might
develop to the effect that transferees who are first in time have priority
over later, purported transferees of the same rights. Perhaps the chief
advantage of this "first in time, first in right" principle is that it pro-
vides a decisional rule which promotes conflict resolution and judicial
economy. It also reflects, and perhaps is better understood in terms of,
the quasi-metaphysical notion that after a right is transferred to one
person, there is nothing left to be transferred to a second party.8 2 (This
notion would apply both to total rights and to partial rights like the
interest of a secured party.) At any rate, the contribution which the
"first in time, first in right" principle makes by itself to the reduction
of both fraud and unfixity costs would appear to be marginal: given
the limitations of oral information, even the most thorough investiga-
tion by a potential second party may fail to discover prior transfers.
A second class of principles that might be seen as evolving in order
to circumvent some of the costs of a system of totally abstract rights
are those based on sheer physical possession. Because physical possession
lends at least some support-in a society where theft is a deviation
rather than the norm-to the inference that the possessor has the right
to the property, possessors may be given preferred status, vis-4-vis
holders of abstract rights, in a variety of conflict situations.8 3
In general, the virtue of the possession principle is that a potential
second secured party is put on notice of possible fraud if his proposed
debtor is not in possession of the collateral in question. But the in-
adequacies of the possession principle are manifold. Intangible rights
cannot be possessed, and thus could not be safely hypothecated in a
system going no further along the road away from abstract rights than
the adoption of the first-in-time and possession principles. More im-
portantly, it is commercially desirable in many situations to allow
debtors to retain possession of collateral needed in their business; if
safe and virtually fraud-proof security interests not based on possession
were achievable, financing possibilities in the general economy would
be increased, with a beneficial effect on real output. Furthermore, the
82. Analysts at home with utilitarian modes of analysis may scorn this sort of reason-
ing, but conceptualistic notions, with their seemingly inevitable logic, surely have some
independent force on legal reasoning-and it perhaps serves utility to let them have their
way in the absence of countervailing considerations.
83. Note that such preference is likely to be curtailed in a society in which the legal
possession and use of other people's property is a common and pervasive aspect of a
complex economic system. Thus, rules of adverse possession in the Anglo-American legal
system require the possessor to have been in possession for a considerable number of
years, to have acted openly as owner rather than as lessee, bailee, pledgee, or thief, and to
have satisfied a variety of other conditions of publicity and lack of ambiguity.
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possession principle as such does little to reduce unfixity costs; a
secured party's possession of a debtor's property may keep the debtor
from forgetting that he has indeed given the property as security to
someone, but it will scarcely be an effective and fixed reminder of
other details of the original secured transaction. Commercial society
therefore inevitably evolves beyond the possession principle.
When rights to intangible property, or to tangible property not in
possession of the owner, are at issue, what might be called the "paper-
izing principle" eventually comes into play. The problem of lack of
verbal fixity is solved by embodying the abstract right in a fixed verbal
formula written down on paper-a formula which, within the restraints
imposed by the shifting nature of linguistic meaning itself, provides
the same basic stimulus to all readers versed in the language. The basic
stimulus may be interpreted and reacted to in different ways by dif-
ferent readers, of course, but the fixity of stimulus reduces the number
and range of these variations.
An embryonic form of the paperizing principle at work is the
Statute of Frauds. By requiring a writing between the parties to a
transaction, unfixity costs are significantly reduced. Fraud costs ought
also to be reduced, in that fraud by one of the parties on the other is
made somewhat more difficult. At least a party will not be able easily
to induce another into an agreement and then later claim-after it
turns out that he has gotten the short end of the bargain-that there
was no agreement.8 4 A Statute of Frauds will do little, however, to
prevent fraud on successive transferees. The existence of a written
security agreement between a debtor and a secured party will not bene-
fit the potential second secured party whom the debtor wishes to de-
fraud unless the potential secured party has knowledge of the prior
agreement and access to an untampered original or an exact copy of it.
If there are no legal rules to ensure that potential secured parties will
have such knowledge and access, they may often be defrauded.
A more developed version of the paperizing principle is found in
paper rights which uniquely embody abstract rights, for example, a
note, a stock certificate, or a document of title. Only one piece of paper
(or one set of papers, if the written material is lengthy) "really" em-
bodies the abstract right; copies may be made, but they are just that-
"mere" copies of a note, certificate, etc., not "the" note or certificate.
84. If a party at the time of entering an agreement actually intends later to renege if
to do so will be to his advantage, the later reneging can, I suggest, properly be labeled
fraudulent. If one disregards subjective intentions, perhaps any reneging not occasioned
by extraordinary circumstances could be called fraudulent.
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This practice of uniquely embodying rights, together with a standard-
ization of forms of embodiment and the development of rules of trans-
fer and negotiation, further reduces unfixity costs and facilitates the
economical transfer of rights through a chain of transferees. Unfortu-
nately, though, despite elaborate rules as to how fraud should be dealt
with and who should suffer its consequences, embodiment does rela-
tively little to reduce fraud costs. There are technical and legal im-
pediments to the successful forging of checks and stock certificates, but
they can be (and often are) overcome.
Be that as it may, in this stage of evolution of the tendency to sup-
press abstraction it becomes natural to accord some kind of preferred
legal status to transferees who take possession of the paperized right.
If, in a given sort of situation, the paperizing of rights becomes com-
mon and the elements of the paperization become fairly standard, pos-
session of the paper is a sensible precaution to take. If A's right in some
property is evidenced by a single piece of paper, a prudent buyer of
the right will want to obtain the piece of paper so as to know exactly
what his right consists of and to be able to demonstrate to future
transferees what he can sell or hypothecate to them. If the buyer should
pay for the right and not bother to obtain the paper, and if A later sells
the paper to a second innocent buyer, then the second buyer would be
given priority in the right over the first, on the grounds that (1) he
was more prudent and (2) the paperizing of such rights, since it per-
forms useful economic and legal functions, is to be encouraged.
The same reasons could extend to the situation where the second
transferee takes a paper right which was only created after the transfer
of the right to the first transferee in abstract form. The basic priority
paradigm analyzed earlier in this article is, of course, a situation of
this kind. Though these remarks about the paperizing principle may
suggest a general solution in favor of the holder of the paper rights,
there is one additional step in the evolution of the tendency to sup-
press abstraction which casts doubt on such a result.
That step is the establishment of central recording or filing sys-
tems .8 Not only is the right paperized, but the paper right, a copy of
it, or notice of it, is kept in a central 0 system to which potential trans-
ferees can make reference. The most obvious examples are the real
estate recording systems. Recording is then given preferred legal status:
85. This will, for example, prevent fraud on successive transferees, an area in which
the Statute of Frauds was found wanting. See p. 476 supra.
86. If there is more than one office at which copies of the paper right or notice of it
are kept, either special priority rules or special procedures to insure uniformity of records
at the various offices are needed.
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a mortgagee can have an enforceable interest, vis-at-vis the owner who is
his debtor, whether or not he records his interest, but he must record
to protect himself against third parties. The recording system, in con-
junction with such rules, probably reduces the overall amount of fraud
that would otherwise result, forcing the fraudulently minded transferor
who wants to conceal a prior adverse transfer to resort to attempts at
bribing the recording officer or colluding with him.
The evolution of this "recording principle" clearly brings a number
of advantages over the stage (not necessarily a temporally prior one) in
which the paperizing principle and rules governing possession of tan-
gible property were the only means of forwarding the policies behind
the goal of eliminating abstraction. Of the doctrines and principles
mentioned (the first-in-time principle, the possession principle, the
paperizing principle as exemplified by the Statute of Frauds and vari-
ous kinds of paper rights, and the recording principle), only the record-
ing principle seems likely to achieve a substantial and decisive reduc-
tion of fraud costs. In addition, there is little a priori reason to believe
that the costs of achieving the reduction will be exorbitant in relation
to the costs of implementing the paperizing principle. Moreover, the
recording principle ought to reduce unfixity costs just as well as the
paperizing principle. A recording or filing system will reduce mistakes
and confusion: the records will either contain, or provide a basis for
obtaining, a written description of outstanding fights in the property
in question, and a diligent putative transferee may discover that his
transferor inadvertently failed to know about, or realize the signifi-
cance and extent of, a prior adverse interest in the property. Finally, a
recording system provides a basis for easily administrable judicial rules,
since the recording system will definitively show which of a series of
defrauded transferees of the same right was first in time to record.
Thus, as a general theoretical matter, the recording principle seems to
be the most advanced point in the evolution of the tendency to suppress
abstraction, and it suggests a general solution to our priority paradigm
(in favor of the first to file) opposite to that (in favor of the paper
holder) suggested by the paperizing principle.
Returning from theory to statute, one readily perceives that the UCC
provides a mixed system which utilizes-and to some extent synthesizes
-all of the chief principles that have developed to reduce the costs of
abstraction. The Code expresses, in § 9-312(5),87 a particular version
of the virtually aboriginal first-in-time principle, though a reading of
87. Quoted in note 63 supra.
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the exceptions to the rule and of the many other rules of and relating
to priority in Part 3 of Article 9 convinces one that the principle, in
its general and unparticularized form, is virtually useless for the resolu-
tion of particular problems. The Code also employs the possession
principle, both in making possession of collateral by the secured party
an alternative to satisfying the Statute of Frauds88 in certain cases and
by making possession a form of perfection of security interests in
tangible collateral and in paper rights.89 The paperizing principle is
reflected in Article 9's particular Statute of Frauds90 and in the recog-
nition and great importance, exemplified by §§ 9-308(a) and 9-309,
that is given to paper rights. Finally, Article 9 is pervaded by refer-
ences to and reliance upon its notice filing system-an inexpensive,
streamlined, unified, widely used and highly successful expression of
the recording principle-the mechanics of which are elaborately artic-
ulated in Part 4 of Article 9.
I have suggested throughout this inquiry that the paperizing principle
is rooted in deep psychological needs as well as in more conventionally
conceived commercial exigencies. The principle as manifested in prac-
tice seems to have acquired a strong and almost unshakeable grip on
the thinking and the intuitive reactions of lawyers. But, given the
existence of a thoroughly mixed system governing security interests, it
is not at all obvious that the paperizing principle, which is a principle
less advanced and less perfect than the recording principle, ought to be
taken as an infallible rule for the solution of all priority problems in-
volving paper rights. One must look instead for the priority rule which,
within a mixed system and in a particular context of commercial prac-
tices and expectations, will most efficiently reduce fraud costs and un-
fixity costs.
88. See § 9-2035()(a).
89. See § 9-305.
90. See § 9-203(1)(a).
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